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Abstract
Saudi Arabia initiative to lead an Islamic Military Alliance 
of 34 countries against terrorism is characterized by 
ambivalence and skewed membership to exclude rival 
Shi’a ideological nations. The timing of the initiative 
bears indices of panicky foreign policy to maintain 
the balance of regional power with Iran now free from 
economic sanctions. Nigeria, tormented by Boko Haram, 
a Sunni Wahhabi al-Qaeda terrorist organization, has 
always received cold shoulders from Saudi Arabia, 
despite appeals for assistance, which informed Nigeria’s 
initial rejection of membership of the Islamic Alliance. 
This has led to desperate arm twisting and foreign policy 
somersault. This paper has put in perspective the rhetorics 
of the Islamic military alliance and Nigeria’s twisted 
foreign policy dictated by desperate national economic 
interests.
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2016, a motley crowd of 59 different groups 
across the world has been officially designated as 
international terrorist organizations by the United States 
Government (State Deptember, 2016), out of which about 
80% of them have strong religious ideological background 
driving their activities. The spread and pervasiveness of 
such organizations capable of deploying violence have 
ruled out any perception in the international community 
that any country is excluded from terrorist attacks. The 
spate of terrorist attacks has been enduring over the years, 
and the perception of insecurity embedded in the psyche 
of many governments in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, 
North and Latin America, and Europe. 
Reuters (2001) puts in perspective the value—
laden challenges in defining a terrorist organization by 
noting that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter. The quest for a value—free understanding of 
the concept of terrorism has been inconclusive. The 
various perspectives have oscillated between focus on the 
political violence, and the motives and justification for 
the international activities of the terrorist organizations 
(Nacos, 2006). The United Nations General Assembly 
(1994) viewed terrorism as criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, 
groups of persons, or particular persons for political 
purposes which are, in any circumstances, unjustifiable, 
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, 
racial, ethnic, religious and other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them. While the liberal nations accept 
the perspective of the United Nations General Assembly’s 
view of terrorism, countries in the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (2002) insist that the concept of 
terrorism and the legitimate struggle of a group against 
oppressive foreign occupation destroying their cultural 
values cannot go together. The US Defense Department 
sees international terrorism as the unlawful or threatened 
use of force or violence against individuals or property 
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often 
to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives 
(Hoffman, 1998). It is imperative to notice that terrorist 
organizations have the preponderance to religious, racial 
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or ethnic beliefs in explaining their actions or threats; 
the usual targets of violence which are unarmed civilians 
who are non-combatants or unsuspecting nationals of 
certain countries or members of a particular religious 
or social groups; and the perpetrators who are largely 
nonstate actors whether they are subgroups or individuals 
(Nacos, 2006). However, this explanation of international 
terrorism seems blind to the critical issue of state—
sponsored or supported terrorism in furtherance of foreign 
policy motives in which states, through their proxies, 
provide financial and technical support to subgroups to 
unleash violence on unfriendly governments or racial 
groups within and outside their various countries. During 
the Cold War period, and in the widening religious divide 
in the Middle East region, it was cynical for opposing 
governments to portray the picture of being major victims 
of international terrorist activities, as the ideological 
divide between the US—led liberal democracies and 
Russia—led socialist authoritarian regimes supported 
right—wing and left—wing subgroups respectively to 
upstage political and economic structures in different 
countries (Crenshaw, 1983; Herman & O’Sullivan, 1989). 
Governments in the Middle East with dominant Sunni 
and Shi’a ideologies and population are offering support 
to extremist subgroups in opposing states to be effective 
opposition outlets in their home states. 
While O’Brien (1983) insist that it would be difficult 
to develop a value—free explanation of the concept of 
terrorism, critically because terrorism was not a scientific 
classification devoid of emotive understanding, Stohl 
(1990) presented a sociological perspective with a three—
step approach, that terrorism generally involves the act 
or threat of violence, the emotional reaction to such an 
act or threat, and the social effects resultant from the acts 
and reactions, as the terrorists were more interested in 
the audience effect and not the victims. In general terms, 
therefore, the key features of activities or structure of an 
organization that could qualify it as perpetuating acts of 
terrorism include the following: intrinsically politically—
driven in aims and objectives in the long term; usually 
discreet in operational activities with conspiratorial cells, 
made up of individuals motivated by ideology and bravery 
of its leaders, as well as authoritarian in structure and 
chain of command; deploys or threatens violence targeting 
agents of state, unarmed civilians, or citizens of unfriendly 
countries, race or ethnicity; the acts of violence or threats 
of violence is designed to have serious psychological 
repercussions beyond the immediate victims; and the 
violence or threats of violence perpetuated by a nonstate 
entity or subnational group that could be independent or 
whose ideological aims are clandestinely supported by a 
state or group of states, even through proxies (Hoffman, 
2006).
The general characteristics enunciated above could 
be deployed in identifying six very active international 
terrorist groups that have gained international attention 
and serious concern in recent times (DePetris, 2015). 
The popular and well—organized terrorist organization 
with a standing military outfit and ultra—conservative 
ideological  i l legi t imate leadership governing a 
geographical territory is the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant/Syria (ISIL or ISIS or the Islamic State). This 
group which gained international attention in 1999 is 
rooted in Wahhabism and Salafi Jihadism ideology of 
Sunni Islam (dominant in Saudi Arabia religious culture 
and exported to other countries), and headquartered in 
Al Raqqah, Syria, under the leadership of Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi. A major operational highpoint of ISIS, 
compared with other Islamist terrorist organizations in 
the international scene, is the ability to overrun, capture 
and hold large landlocked portions of two sovereign 
states—Iraq and Syria in the Middle East—in which it 
declared an Islamic caliphate where the terrorist group 
imposed political, religious, and economic authority over 
the inhabitants. Under the imposed strict Sharia law, ISIS 
has been notorious for extreme human rights abuses and 
deployment of the social media in showing audio —
visual recordings of beheading or execution of civilians 
and captured soldiers, as well as destruction of cultural 
heritage sites. The military and human rights activities 
of ISIS have also attracted US and Russia—led military 
bombardments of the group, and its rebel allies, to stop its 
territorial ambition and plans to overrun the governments 
of Iraq and Syria respectively. Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin, in mid March 2016, ordered the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Syria claiming it had achieved its 
goal of pushing back and weakening ISIS and other rebel 
groups from overthrowing the Syrian Arab Republic 
authorities in Damascus (Al Jazeera, 2016). 
The Al-Qaeda is another very active terrorist 
organization founded in August 1988 by the original 
leaders comprising Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam 
and other volunteers initially to fight against the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The al-Qaeda 
is a global militant group, without territorial control 
and governance like ISIS, pursuing the ideology of the 
supremacy of the Sunni Wahhabi jihadist religious ideas 
of arresting foreign influences in muslim countries, 
strict enforcement of Sharia laws and creation of a new 
caliphate ruling over the Middle East. The group took the 
global community by surprise with September 11, 2001 
simultaneous hijack of commercial airlines that slammed 
into the twin towers of the World Trade Centres in New 
York and the Pentagon Building in Washington DC. It 
is the most widespread terrorist group and has outlets 
operating in the Maghreb, West Africa, Arabian Peninsula, 
India, Somalia, Syria, Sinai Peninsula, Yemen, Iraq, 
Pakistan and Egypt. ISIS initially pledged its allegiance to 
al-Qaeda, but both groups fell apart in 2014 to pursue their 
hegemonic struggle for religious authority and political 
relevance (BBC, 2014; Reuters 2014). Another active 
international terrorist group is Boko Haram which operates 
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largely in the northeastern geopolitical zones of Nigeria, 
northern Cameroun, parts of Chad and Niger Republic. 
It was founded in 2002, and has pledged allegiance to al-
Qaeda and ISIS. Boko Haram is a Wahhabi fundamentalist 
sect driven by the ideology of Wahhabism and Salafism, 
advocating enforcement of Sharia law and contempt for 
Western education. Like ISIS and al-Qaeda, Boko Haram 
seeks the establishment of an Islamic State in Nigeria, and 
has been notorious for kidnappings, suicide bombing and 
destruction of public infrastructures in the northern parts 
of the country. Besides, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps—Quds Force, founded in 1979, is another active 
terrorist organization based in Tehran, Iran, and pledges 
its allegiance to the Supreme Religious Leader in Iran. It 
is a militia rooted in Islamic Shi’a ideological perspective, 
and opposed to ISIS and operates to support other terrorist 
groups in the Middle East as a foreign policy instrument 
to improve on Iran’s regional hegemony in the region. 
The Quds Force has operational cooperation, in terms of 
financial aid and arms shipment, with violent groups like 
the Lebanese Hezbollah, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-
Haq, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Syria’s Bashar 
al’Assad (DePetris, 2015). The other two active groups 
are the Haqqani Network and the Kata’ib Hezbollah. The 
former (Haqqani Network) founded in 1980 on ideology 
of Deobandi fundamentalism and operational on both sides 
of the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders, has longstanding 
violent attacks on US – led NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) forces and Afghan government institutions. 
The latter (Kata’ib Hezbollah) operational in 2003, on the 
ideology of Shi’a ideology of Islam, and based in southern 
Iraq, is an Iraqi Shi’a paramilitary group active in Iraqi 
insurgency and Syrian civil war, opposed to ISIS.
1 .  S A U D I  A R A B I A - L E D  I S L A M I C 
INITIATIVE TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM 
The idea of a 34-nation Islamic Military Alliance to 
Fight Terrorism was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s 
knee-jerk military diplomatic contraption in December 
2015, in apparent response to the growing Western 
nations’ criticism and concern of other Muslim-populated 
countries around the world that the Kingdom was not 
doing enough to tackle the spread of Islamic extremism 
wrapped in violence. The Islamic Military Alliance, to 
be operationally headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 
has the declared objectives of fighting terrorism and 
developing the necessary programmes and mechanisms 
for supporting these efforts, with the core area of 
military operations listed as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt 
and Afghanistan (curiously Nigeria not listed despite the 
enduring daily wave of terrorism from Boko Haram). 
The countries invited into the membership of the Islamic 
Military Alliance were as follows: Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Benin, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Gabon, Guinea, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen (Saudi Arabia Foreign 
Affairs, 2015). 
The membership indicates that almost 60% are 
members of the Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC), and 59% are African countries with muslim 
population. The geopolitical spread of the countries 
listed encompasses the Middle East, Africa, and South 
Asia. However, Indonesia, the country with the highest 
population of muslims, oil-rich Iran and Iraq, as well as 
war-ravaged Syria in the Middle East were not listed, 
same for Afghanistan, Azerbarjan and Tajikistan with 
dominant muslim population. Critically, Iran, a regional 
power in the Middle East, was deliberately not listed 
by Saudi Arabia as a muslim nation she could form an 
alliance with to fight Islamic terrorism. Viewed from 
the ideological and religious rivalry between the Saudi 
Arabia-led Islamic Sunni Wahhabism and Iran-led 
Islamic Shi’a bifurcation of the practices of Islam and 
influence on muslims worldwide, the Saudi initiative 
of the Islamic Military Alliance was a foreign policy 
instrument largely to protect the national power interest 
of the ultra-conservative Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi rhetorics of an Islamic Military Alliance could be 
viewed from the political realist theoretical perspective 
in which its foreign policy was to engage in international 
politics of sustenance of the status quo and display of 
power prestige with the assemblage of 34 nations to 
its Islamic cause. Morgenthau and Thompson (1985) 
described nations’ foreign policy as international politics 
with three basic patterns aimed at the struggle for power. 
They posited that the foreign policy of status quo is 
targeted at the maintenance of the prevailing distribution 
of power, the policy of imperialism seeks the overthrow of 
the prevailing power distribution structure and a reversal 
of the power relations, while the foreign policy of prestige 
is the pleasant by-product of actions and strategies with 
the ultimate objectives of increasing the perception 
of influence and sustenance of power. Thus, foreign 
policy of nations seeks to keep power, increase power or 
demonstrate power in the international arena at all times. 
As a regional power, with immense military, economic 
and religious influence in the Middle East, and in 
the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia seek to maintain the 
prevailing balance of power in its favour, especially in 
relation to Iran as a rival power in the regional geopolitics. 
By taking the initiative to establish and warehouse in 
Riyadh the 34-nation Islamic Military Alliance, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia developed a foreign policy 
instrument to sustain her hegemony and primal position 
in the Middle East especially and in the global Muslim 
community. As a corollary, the foreign policy thrust of 
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Saudi Arabia is also to demonstrate prestige as it seeks to 
“impress other nations with the power one’s own nation 
actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants 
the other nations to believe, it possesses” (Morgenthau 
& Thompson, 1985, p.87). By the readiness to host the 
Islamic Military Alliance and lead in displaying military 
force, the foreign policy of prestige is deployed both as 
a deterrent to, and a preparation for, war. The political 
rhetorics are encapsulated in the propaganda which is 
aimed at increasing the prestige of ones own side, deflate 
that of the rivals and impress or influence the weaker 
nations in the Muslim-dominated Middle East region 
especially. In international politics, alliances, especially 
in dealing with economic and military interests, are 
instruments deployed to achieve definitive gains in power 
relations in terms of status quo sustenance, imperialistic 
tendencies to reverse power relations, and reputation 
display. Goldstein (2008) explained that an alliance, in 
international power politics, is a coalition of states that 
coordinate their actions and inactions to accomplish 
defined ends, and have the primary purpose of augmenting 
their collective power relative to other states not in the 
coalition. Therefore, most alliances thrive as a response 
to a perceived threat, and are marriages of convenience 
based on national interests that may be dynamic. Alliances 
recognize the sovereignty of states, and its cohesion as 
well as aggregate power capabilities could determine its 
credibility to achieve its purpose, and earn international 
respect. Thus, Saudi Arabia initiative of the Islamic 
Military Alliance is an intergovernmental cooperation of 
34 countries with Muslim population in the Middle East, 
Africa and Southern Asia to fight a supposed common 
cause—Islamic international terrorism already giving the 
religion a negative image in the international community, 
destroying the economy and infrastructures in the Middle 
East, and seeking to overthrow regimes on the opposing 
divide of the ideological beliefs in Islam
2. SAUDI ARABIA MILITARY CAPABILITY 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which the Al Saud 
dynasty holds the monopoly of political and judicial power 
and directs religious practices, is the second largest state 
in the Arab world (after Algeria). The country boasts of 
two sea coast outlets—the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf—
with immense economic power arising from its crude 
oil production capacity and reserves. Saudi Arabia hosts 
the two holy Mosques in Islam in Mecca and Medina. In 
the Middle East and across the world, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has demonstrated very serious interest in its 
security with high military expenditures. In 2013, Saudi 
Arabia’s military expenditures hit $67 billion in weaponry 
acquisition and training, making it the highest in the 
Middle East region, and ahead of the United Kingdom, 
France and Japan (Al Jazeera, 2014). The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute reports that out of 
the 15 countries with the highest military expenditures in 
the world in 2014, Saudi Arabia was adjudged the fourth 
globally, with the United States of America leading with 
$610 billion; China ($216 billion); Russia ($84.5 billion); 
Saudi Arabia ($80.8 billion); France ($62.3 billion); 
and the United Kingdom ($60.5 billion) (SIPRI, 2014). 
The London—based International Institute for Strategic 
Studies assessment of military expenditures in the world 
for 2015 indicated that Saudi Arabia had moved up to 
the third highest position globally in military related 
purchases. According to the Institute (2015), the USA still 
leads the pack of 10 world highest spenders on military 
on military hardware and training with $597.5 billion; 
followed by China ($145.8 billion); Saudi Arabia ($81.8 
billion); the United Kingdom ($56.2 billion); and Russia 
($51.6 billion). 
Table 1
World Highest  Mil i tary Expenditures—2014 
(Attached)
Rank Country Amount ($ billion) Percentage of GDP
1 USA 610 3.5
2 China 216 2.1
3 Russia 84.5 4.5
4 Saudi Arabia 80.8 10.4
5 France 62.3 2.2
6 United Kingdom 60.5 2.2
7 India 50.0 2.4
8 Germany 46.5 1.2
9 Japan 48.5 1.0
10 South Korea 36.7 2.6
11 Brazil 31.7 1.4
12 Italy 30.9 1.5
13 Australia 25.4 1.9
14 UAE 22.8 5.1
15 Turkey 22.6 2.2
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Report 
(www.sipri.org, 2014). 
Table 2
Top 10 World Military Spending Countries – 2015 
(Attached)
Rank Country Spending($Bn) % of GDP Per capita $
1 USA 597.5 3.3 1,859
2 China 145.8 1.2 106
3 Saudi Arabia 81.8 12.9 2,949
4 UK 56.2 2.0 878
5 Russia 51.6 4.1 362
6 India 47.9 2.2 35
7 France 46.7 1.9 702
8 Japan 41.0 1.0 323
9 Germany 36.6 1.1 454
10 South Korea 33.4 2.4 681
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: 
Routledge, 2015). 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has eight countries 
as neighbours namely Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, Yemen 
and Bahrain. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has acquired 
sophisticated military weapons from Western allies 
especially the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom and France to protect her national interests and 
territorial integrity. Between 1951 and 2006, the USA sold 
high technology military arsenal worth over $80 billion to 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and over a four-year period 
(2010- 2014), military hardware imported by the Kingdom 
were 38 combat helicopters from the USA, 45 combat 
aircraft from the United Kingdom, 600 armoured vehicles 
from Canada, as well as outstanding orders involving 154 
combat aircraft from the USA and 27 other fighter aircraft 
from the United Kingdom (SIPRI, 2014). In 2010, the US 
State Department had announced to the US Congress that 
the biggest arms sales deal in American history to a single 
country worth a whopping $60.5 billion had been sealed 
with the Saudi Arabia (Teitelbaun, 2010). The probability 
is high that, in terms of high-tech military weaponry, and 
immense support from the Western allies, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia has the capability to propagate the 
foreign policies of status quo and prestige in the region 
in the Middle East and the Muslim world. The critical 
issue is whether the conservative authorities in Saudi 
Arabia would turn same military arsenal against hard 
line religious adherents propagating the approved Sunni 
Wahhabism brand of Islam abroad and seeking to extend 
the influence of the Kingdom in the Muslim world, against 
countries driven by rival Shi’a ideological perspectives 
in the teaching and practices of Islam. Already, the initial 
objective of the Saudi—led Islamic Military Alliance is 
to tackle terrorists in Iraq, Syria and Libya. These are 
countries that have Shi’a—biased political leadership in 
place, and have been seriously contending with the Sunni 
Wahhabi—friendly ISIS and other rebel groups in the 
battlefields. The neutrality of Saudi Arabia in the military 
alliance, and its interest to secure and stabilize rival 
Islamic religious adherents in political authority in other 
countries seem far-fetched. 
3 .  N I G E R I A’ S  F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y 
SOMERSAULT
Nigeria has been grappling with the dreaded terrorist 
group, Boko Haram, a Wahhabi al-Qaeda violent 
organization, very vicious in its operations against the 
Nigerian state and innocent civilians. Described as the 
Nigerian Talibans, the ultra—conservative group took 
on a violent approach to its activities after the extra—
judicial killing of its original founder, Muhammad 
Yusuf, by Nigerian security forces in Borno State, and 
was succeeded by radicalized Abubakar Shekau. The 
group launched its first attack on the medium security 
prison in Bauchi in September 2010, and freed over 700 
inmates, including 150 Boko Haram members (Sani, 
2010). By adopting the tactics of the Talibans and al-
Qaeda, the Nigerian—based terrorist group launched 
series of shootings and suicide attacks on churches and 
later mosques as well as public places with civilian 
population like markets, and bus stops; bombings of 
public infrastructures; and kidnapping of civilians 
especially young females; deployment of the social media 
for propaganda to create fear in the minds of the public, 
and declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda and later ISIS. 
The international connections of Boko Haram opened the 
floodgate of heavy weaponry, communication gadgets 
and guerrilla warfare training from insurgents abroad 
with the support of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), 
MUJAO in Sub-Saharan Africa, Al-Shabbab in Somalia, 
and rebel groups in Libya (Alli & Ogunwale, 2011; 
Ogunseye 2012). The terrorist organization in Nigeria, 
which has killed over 20,000 persons, had operational 
cooperation with ANSARU until 2012 when the latter 
disagreed with Boko Haram over the killing of fellow 
Muslims following the attacks in Kano in January 2012 
leading to the death of 150 innocent civilians, mostly 
muslims (Zenn, 2013).
The linkages of Boko Haram to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia have been quite established. Apart from its 
ideological slant of Sunni Wahhabism, the predominant 
Islamic culture approved by the Saudi politico—religious 
leadership and allowed amongst the population in the 
Kingdom, Boko Haram once felt comfortable to demand 
that Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, should be the 
location for a botched ceasefire negotiation between it and 
the Federal Government of Nigeria (Mark, 2012). Boko 
Haram leaders have utilized same Saudi Arabian location 
for discussion with al-Qaeda leaders during the lesser hajj 
(umra) in August 2011, and the funding of the terrorist 
organization has been traced to certain organizations in 
Saudi Arabia with the assistance of AQIM (Adisa, 2012). 
In 2004, Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammad Yusuf, took 
refuge in Saudi Arabia in a tactical move to evade the 
initial crackdown on the violent inclinations of the group 
by Nigerian security forces (Zenn, 2013). 
Thus, when Nigeria was listed amongst the 34 
countries proposed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to 
be part of the Islamic Military Alliance to fight terrorism, 
Nigeria outrightly rejected the offer of membership. 
Although the details of the Saudi initiative were sketchy, 
Nigeria was neither excited nor convinced about 
the sincerity of the Saudis, principally based on the 
established historical, religious, financial and intelligence 
linkages of Boko Haram to Saudi Arabia’s brand of 
religious extremism, and the lukewarm attitude of the 
Saudi authorities to Nigeria’s initial plea for assistance to 
stem the wave of violent activities of the terrorist group 
in Nigeria. Following the bilateral meeting between 
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President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria and the King 
of Saudi Arabia, Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz, in Riyadh, in 
February 2016, the Nigerian President told the world, 
in an official statement, that Nigeria would not honour 
the Saudis’ invitation to join the Islamic States Military 
Coalition, noting that “even if we are not part of it, we 
support you, especially your efforts in keeping the peace 
and stopping the spread of terror in your region.” (Shehu, 
2016, p.1). Nigeria had specifically directed Saudi 
Arabia’s efforts to the Middle East, as the Kingdom has 
shown disinterest in the terrorist activities in Nigeria 
for several years on. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
not offered Nigeria any financial or technical assistance 
despite Nigeria’s desperate appeals for international 
assistance. Three critical reasons could account for this. 
First, Saudi’s national interest is the promotion of the 
Sunni variant of Islamic culture across the world through 
the vehicle of Wahhabi ideology, and that was part of 
the religious mission of Boko Haram, in addition to its 
political objective of setting up an Islamic state, probably 
to be mentored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Second, 
Saudi Arabia treated Boko Haram issues as an African 
affair that should be handled as peripheral to its core 
security interests, and not capable of reversing the balance 
of power in the Middle East. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia would 
not want to upset her major Western allies, the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom, which held 
back any form of financial and technical assistance 
from Nigeria despite their rhetorics of fighting terrorism 
anywhere in the world. In 2014, the US government 
placed an arms embargo on Nigeria on the allegations 
of human rights abuses by the Nigerian Army fighting 
guerrilla warfare, and ensured that its allies, including the 
United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, frustrated arms sales 
to Nigeria. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia even refused 
to grant permission to overfly its airspace in transporting 
arms to Nigeria (Lakemfa, 2016). The hard line policy 
of the Saudis is reflective of the peripheral position of 
Nigeria’s stability and internal security to Saudi Arabia’s 
national interests. 
However, the international community, and Nigerians 
indeed, were taken aback by the policy somersault of 
the Nigerian government a fortnight later, when same 
President Buhari announced in an interview in Al Jazeera 
news network that: 
We (Nigeria) are part of it (the Islamic Military Alliance) 
because we have terrorists in Nigeria that everyone knows. So, 
if there’s an Islamic Coalition to fight terrorism, Nigeria will be 
part of it because we are the casualties of Islam terrorism. (Al 
Jazeera, 2016)
The Nigerian leader rationalized that Boko Haram has 
pledged allegiance to ISIS which was terrorizing certain 
Islamic countries, and that troops to the Alliance will be 
contributed from the Lake Chad Basin Commission, a 
sub-regional grouping fighting the spread of Boko Haram, 
comprising Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. 
The policy reversal was the product of serious diplomatic 
horse trading while the Nigerian President performed the 
lesser hajj in Saudi Arabia and visited the Qatar Prime 
Minister, Sheikh Abdullah ibn Khalifah Al Thani. The 
Saudis desperately needed the membership of Nigeria, as 
the most populous and influential black nation, to assist 
garner the support of other listed sub-Saharan African 
countries and raise the credibility of the Military Alliance.
The political realism of economic survival of Nigeria, 
buffeted by the serious crisis of low income from crude 
oil, the main stay of the economy, was the key driving 
force behind the Nigerian President’s state visit to the 
Saudi King and Qatar authority in February, 2016. The 
price of crude oil in the international market had fallen to 
the low ebb of $27 per barrel in January 2016 (the lowest 
in 12 years), and Nigeria, which depends on its crude for 
survival, and prepared the 2016 national budget with an 
oil sale benchmark of $38 per barrel, was in economic 
doldrums. Nigeria require higher oil prices to finance her 
2016 national budget of N6.07 trillion, with a deficit of 
N2.22 trillion (equivalent of 2.16 per cent of her Gross 
Domestic Product – GDP) and level of borrowing put 
at N900 billion (foreign) and N946 billion (domestic) 
(Nigeria Budget Office, 2016). Saudi Arabia’s policy 
since 2014 when the US Shale oil production gathered 
momentum was to increase production and protect her 
market share. Purvis (2016) argued that in the global 
oil market, it is the strategic behavior of the producing 
titans, not the slow motion supply—demand balance, that 
has the real power to move the markets. The behavior 
of Saudi Arabia has shown its intent to increase both 
production capacity and supply, a pattern still unabated. 
In response to the growing influence of the US Shale oil 
in the global market, Saudi Arabia began an ambitious 
and rapid rig count expansion in its history to increase 
supply into the market. If this situation persists, Nigeria, 
with less diversified economy, under the umbrella of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), will remain in serious economic quagmire. As 
an economic power and the most influential member of 
OPEC, Saudi Arabia pressured other OPEC members 
to increase output in an oversupplied market, with the 
expectation that such move would force higher—cost 
producers to scale down their operations. Critically, the 
zero—sum game between Nigeria and Saudi Arabia 
was the interests between economic survival and the 
military alliance. Nigeria’s policy somersault was to 
gain the assurance of the Saudi King to intervene in the 
oil production scenario, and secure his commitment to 
raise the international price of crude oil (Shehu, 2016), in 
order to save Nigeria’s economy from collapse, and for 
Saudi Arabia, she recovered from the initial international 
embarrassment of Nigeria’s rejection of membership of 
the Islamic military alliance. Nigeria desperately needed 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to bolster its economic 
fortunes with new production behavior and cut back 
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strategies to raise prices and earn foreign exchange. 
Nigeria’s Minister of Petroleum, Ibe Kachikwu, gleefully 
announced in Doha, Qatar, the strong assurances of the 
Saudi King to rein in OPEC and non-OPEC members 
like Russia to agree to freeze production by April 2016, 
and by implication raise crude oil prices (The Punch, 
2016). With the political pressure from Saudi Arabia on 
other oil producers, Qatar, which holds the Presidency 
of the OPEC for 2016, also announced that 15 OPEC 
and non-OPEC producers, accounting for about 73% 
of the world oil output, were supporting the oil freeze 
in production in order to raise international prices (The 
Punch, 2016). 
The political economy perspective, not national 
security concerns, to the Nigerian policy somersault is 
further indicated by Saudi Arabia’s offer to Nigeria liberal 
financial assistance through the Islamic Development 
Bank (IDB) to the 19 Northern States where the 
population of Muslims is significant in Nigeria, and 
whose economy and public infrastructure are devastated 
by the violence of Boko Haram insurgents over the past 
five years (Vanguard, 2016). The offer from the Saudis, 
through the Islamic Development Bank, was blown open 
by the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria through 
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign and 
Domestic Debts, Senator Shehu Sani. The major concern 
of the Senate was the need for the Federal Government 
of Nigeria to ensure that the foreign aid deal follows due 
process as prescribed in the Nigerian laws, especially the 
Debt Management Office Act 2003, External Borrowing 
Guidelines and approval of the National Assembly 
(Nation, 2016). It is important to highlight the narrow 
Islamic interests of the Saudi financial overtures to 
Nigeria, which limited its financial assistance to the 
northern states with significant Muslim population. The 
Islamic Development Bank is a multilateral development 
financing institution founded in 1973 as a financial arm 
of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), with the 
leading investment from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(IDB, 2016).
It is yet to be seen how the membership of the alliance 
would add military value to the on-going campaign by 
the Nigerian government and other Lake Chad Basin 
Commission member countries against the menace of 
Boko Haram insurgency in the region. The Saudi Arabia 
authority is yet to offer technical assistance, in terms of 
weaponry, to the Nigerian government which had sought 
arms and ammunition in the international market since 
2013 to be able to tackle the insecurity in the northeastern 
parts of the country, and parts of Cameroun, Chad and 
Niger Republic. While Saudi Arabia has not shown any 
visible interest in Nigeria’s internal security woes with 
the devastating and perennial attacks of Boko Haram, a 
Wahhabi Al-Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in May 2014 announced that she was ready to extend any 
kind of assistance to the Nigeria government to find and 
free the 276 school girls in Chibok town, in Borno State, 
Nigeria, kidnapped by the terrorist group (Iranian Foreign 
Ministry, 2014). 
The economic desperation of the Nigerian government 
made it to downplay the potential threat that the Iran—
friendly vibrant and rival Shi’a Muslims in Nigeria could 
pose to the country’s stability, as the proposed membership 
of the Islamic Military Alliance is glaringly an initiative to 
protect and defend the Sunni Muslims, with the deliberate 
exclusion of Iran and Iraq from the membership. In the 
Middle East geopolitics, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
view Iran as a rival regional power supporting revolt 
against the traditional Sunni Islamic religious practices 
dominant in Saudi Arabia and exported to the Muslim 
world, as well as seeking political re-engineering of the 
Middle East through the instrumentality of protests for 
reforms in different countries. The Nigerian authorities 
also view the Shi’a Muslim population in the northern 
parts of the country as engineering unwanted rivalry with 
the Sunni majority population in the country. Nigeria 
stoked a diplomatic row with Iran over the Nigerian Army 
killing of members of the Iranian – sponsored and popular 
Shi’a Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), and arrest of 
its leader, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky in the northern town of 
Zaria, Kaduna State, on December 13, 2015. The claim of 
the Nigerian Army was that members of the Movement 
who gathered for a ceremony blocked the road and denied 
access to the convoy of the Chief of Army Staff and his 
entourage, and in the altercation, gunshots rang out from 
both the members and soldiers (The Punch, 2015). The 
hard line approach in dealing with the Movement could 
be an indicator to crackdown on Islamic fundamentalists, 
but could also open the window of appeasement to the 
Saudi—supported Sunni Muslims. There have been 
worries about the potentiality of Nigeria becoming the 
staging outposts of terrorist groups arising from the 
meddlesomeness of Sunni and Shi’a fundamentalist states 
of Saudi Arabia and Iran. These two Middle East countries 
have the proclivity of externalizing their differences 
in national interest pursuits to other Muslim countries 
utilizing religious ideologies as the vehicle.
Diplomatically, the Saudi pressure on, and economic 
carrots offered to, Nigeria for urgent policy reversal on 
membership of the Islamic Military Alliance, was to 
use Nigeria as the key player in rallying other West and 
East African countries to project the Saudi initiative. It 
was expected that the ability to win Nigeria over to the 
Saudi project could be leveraged on other black African 
countries listed such as Benin, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Sudan 
and Togo. Following Nigeria’s policy summersault, Saudi 
Arabia was assured of some troops from the Lake Chad 
Basin Commission—a coalition of Benin, Chad, Niger, 
Nigeria, and Cameroun (not listed for membership of the 
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Islamic Alliance) contributing soldiers to fight the spread 
of Boko Haram insurgency. 
CONCLUSION
The timing of the Saudi Arabia initiative of an Islamic 
Military Alliance is instructive in the geopolitics of the 
Middle East, as it was announced soon after the USA 
and other Western allies lifted the international economic 
sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
successful implementation of the nuclear and sanction—
free deal between Iran and P5+1 (the five permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council – China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and USA, —plus 
Germany) in collaboration with the European Union, 
has re-positioned the Islamic Republic of Iran as a rival 
regional and middle power in the Middle East and in the 
Muslim world. The deliberate exclusion of Iran from the 
membership of the Islamic Military Alliance is a testament 
to the deepened rivalry and extreme divergence in the 
foreign policies of both states. The discomfort of Saudi 
Arabia during the Iranian nuclear programme impasse 
with the Western allies was so strong that Saudi King 
urged the US to attack Iran and “cut off the head of the 
snake” (Black & Tisdall, 2010, p.1). Besides, US former 
ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Robert 
Jordan, described the eventual success of the Iranian and 
P5+1 deal and lifting of the economic sanctions as “Saudis 
worst nightmare” (McDowall, 2013, p.1). 
In the theocratic Sunni and Shi’a—dominated States 
in the Middle East, the distinction between the state 
and religion is blurred. Ademoyo (2016) posits that 
the social roots of terrorism traced to Islam could be 
derived from the exclusivist theological practices of the 
Salafi Islamic ideology in Saudi Arabia, exported as 
Wahhabism outside the Kingdom, which insist on Salafi 
as the authentic Islam and gives no room for dissent. 
Saudi Arabia is home to the Salafi / Wahhabism ideology 
as its official sect. The country’s theocracy is a marriage 
between the Salafi institution and the political structures. 
Saudi Arabia’s brand of Islamic belief and practices 
encourages extremism and intolerance, and promotes 
violent tendencies to enforce obedience and imposition 
of religious and political ways of life. The extremism and 
violent tendencies could be seen from the fact that active 
and vicious Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al-
Qaeda and its various global off-shoots, ISIS, MUJAO, 
al-Shabbab, Boko Haram, ANSARU bear strong imprint 
of Salafi / Wahhabism ideology. Besides Osama bin 
Laden who was the leader, 15 out of 19 hijackers of 
September 11, 2001 bombing of the twin towers of the 
World Trade Centre in New York, as well as the Pentagon, 
were from Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed, 2010), while in 
ISIS – occupied Raqqa, the seat of its operations, in mid-
2014, all 12 judges of Sharia law and enforcement were 
Saudis (Economist, 2015). Even the US hold the official 
view that its key ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, 
supports terrorist groups, and former Secretary of State, 
Hilary Clinton, said thus: “Saudi Arabia remains a critical 
financial support base for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
other terrorist groups…donors in Saudi Arabia constitute 
the most significant source of funding to Sunni (Salafi / 
Wahhabi—driven) terrorist groups worldwide” (Walsh, 
2010, p.1).
Thus, the Saudi initiative is a foreign policy instrument 
to maintain its hegemonic position and influence in the 
Middle East, and in the Muslim—populated states in 
Africa and Southern Asia. Aside from its aversion to 
republicanism and democratic tendencies that arose 
from the Arab Spring in 2010, Saudi Arabia is very 
uncomfortable with the rival regional power, Iran, with 
the economic sanctions lifted and has the potential to 
fund irredentist Islamic movements within and outside 
Saudi Arabia. In packaging the Military Alliance as an 
“Islamic” coalition but excluding the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Iraq was a foreign policy miscalculation that has 
diminished the credibility and wider acceptability of the 
initiative to other critical Muslim nations and the Western 
world. The ambivalence of the Islamic Military Alliance 
is further indicated in the lack of extensive diplomatic 
consultations and planning. The initial responses of the 
countries listed as members of the military alliance were 
either silence, surprise or measured optimism but no 
commitments. Even the US, the leading Western ally 
of Saudi Arabia, issued an official statement expressing 
cautious optimism, looking “forward to learning more 
about what Saudi Arabia has in mind in terms of this 
coalition” (DeYoung, 2015, p.1).
It is imperative therefore for Nigeria to properly 
define and protect her national interests in the short 
and long terms in view of her promised involvement 
in the Islamic Military Alliance. No doubt, there is no 
public record of the Nigerian President’s sudden policy 
reversal being deliberated upon by the Federal Executive 
Council to x-ray the policy options for Nigeria in view 
of Nigeria’s peculiar economic, security and secular 
interests. Besides, the Senate of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria was not consulted in accepting membership of a 
foreign military alliance, and puts the Government in bad 
light of the provisions of Section 12 of 1999 Constitution 
of the Federation of Nigeria (Alechenu et al., 2016). The 
economic carrot offered to Nigeria by Saudi Arabia is not 
an absolute deal, as its success will depend on the initial 
and continued cooperation of other major oil producers 
in the international market. Already Iran and Iraq, two 
major producers who are members of OPEC, have backed 
out of the new arrangement for production freeze because 
of the long negative effects of the economic sanctions 
and long-drawn war respectively on their economy, and 
have insisted, rather, on seriously raising their daily 
crude oil production level to pre-sanctions and war times 
(Sims, 2016). Besides, Kuwait has also insisted that all 
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stakeholders must be brought to the negotiating table 
(veiled reference to Iran and Iraq refusal to cooperate) 
before she could agree to an oil production freeze (Stratfor, 
2016). 
In Nigeria, the religious peace between Christians and 
Muslims, especially in the northern parts of the country, 
is very fragile. Despite the fact that Section 10 of the 
Constitution of the Federation (1999) declared Nigeria a 
secular state, the apprehension amongst the Christian folks 
in the country over the policy somersault of the Nigerian 
government on membership of an Islamic Military 
Alliance is predicated on the diminishing reputation of the 
Federal Government following the inability of its security 
forces to protect non-Muslims and their residences, 
places of worship and businesses from unprovoked 
attacks from Boko Haram insurgents and armed Muslim 
herdsmen. The Nigerian Christians are not happy over this 
policy decision on membership of the Islamic—branded 
military alliance by the Nigerian President, a conservative 
Muslim with open Islamic convictions, reminiscent of 
the surreptitious approval of Nigeria’s membership of the 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in 1985 under 
a military junta headed by General Ibrahim Babangida, 
another Muslim, who also did not table the matter before 
the then legislative/executive decision making organ—the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council. The military elite religious 
power tussle and public embarrassment for the military 
regime led to the sack to the second- in-command, Navy 
Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, in that junta. 
The critical issues in countering the violent and 
guerrilla warfare operations of the terrorist groups are 
the access to, and purchase of, firearms and sophisticated 
weaponry with which organized military outfits like ISIS, 
Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram raid and resist national armed 
forces. The ease with which terrorist groups access arms 
and ammunition is an international issue beyond the 
capacity of Saudi Arabia and few Muslim—populated 
countries in an alliance, as arms could be purchased from 
anywhere in the world. It calls for concerted action to be 
driven under the UN Security Council. 
It is suggested that the double edged anti—terrorism 
measures that Saudi Arabia could seriously deploy, and 
within its capability for now, are to deliberately tone down 
the extremism and intolerance of the Salafi / Wahhabi 
ideological perspective of Islam being propagated by 
terrorist groups in other parts of the world, leading 
to violence and insurgencies; and to seriously cut off 
financial lifeline from donors and private sources to 
these terrorist groups that enables them to seek and 
purchase arm and ammunition, as well pay their fighters 
and volunteers. The probability that Saudi Arabia 
would bomb her Sunni brothers propagating the Salafi / 
Wahhabi Islamic practices, the accepted official culture 
of the Saudis, and in line with the national interests of 
the Kingdom, is still far-fetched. The alliance could 
therefore serve much more as the instrument of containing 
opposition terrorist groups spreading imperialistic Islamic 
ideologies from rival countries, in order to maintain 
the regional balance of power and influence in Islamic 
leadership for Saudi Arabia. The alliance has the potential 
of boosting the prestige of the Kingdom as a hegemon 
in Islamic power politics in the Middle East, and in the 
Muslim—populated countries of the world, instead of 
actually diminishing the violence quotient of terrorist 
organizations already trailing the blaze in making the 
world more insecure and unstable. This still leaves Nigeria 
with its internal insecurity challenge spearheaded by Boko 
Haram insurgency, and probably more money to spend in 
acquiring new military hardware, and on welfare of battle-
weary soldiers, if the Saudi Arabia keeps her commitment 
on production freeze and international oil market picks up 
in pricing.
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